Daewoo
I was recently reading Dominique Manotti’s The Lorraine Connection for possible use in one of my classes. (Can’t assign it; too much sex.) It’s a good example of the contemporary French polar–noir, political, cynical, a mystery novel that grafts fictional characters onto well known events and purports to tell the real story behind the cover-up. (See Ross, “Paris Noir.”) Manotti’s main characters are the detective, Charles Montoya, and Rolande Lepetit. He is a former cop with a black mark on his record; she is the working class militant he is attracted to. The well-known events are the circumstances surrounding the closure of the three Daewoo factories in Lorraine, in 2002-2003.
The Daewoo affair is particularly tailored to the paranoid mindset, and little imagination is needed. Lorraine, once an industrial powerhouse in the northeast of France, was devastated by the mining and steel mill closures in the region, accelerating in the late twentieth century. The South Korean multinational Daewoo received generous French government subsidies to build three factories in the region: Villers-la-Montagne, for microwave ovens; Fameck, for televisions; Mont-Saint-Martin, for cathode tubes. There were some strikes and labor disputes, and then suddenly, and within a few months of each other, all three of the factories were shuttered. One of them also burned down; workers claimed that they had seen the records of Swiss bank accounts (with the names of unwitting workers on them), obviously a means of skimming and concealing the profits; but they had failed to take custody of the computers, and so there was no proof (Bon, p. 16).
There have, of course, been numerous factory closings in the globalized world, as ugly impermanent structures are built and emptied (and sold, if they’re lucky) and the production moves on to greener pastures and lower wages. What makes Daewoo different is the company’s spectacular global collapse and the conviction for fraud of several of its top executives, including the founder. There is also the fact that François Bon published Daewoo in 2004. Bon called Daewoo (not yet translated into English) a “novel,” even though it is written as an ethnographic study based on interviews with many of the women, especially, who were laid off. The use of the term “novel” is not particularly troubling; in an interview, Bon made the point that his presentation of the scene, as with Balzac, as with sociologists (and as with historians), was of necessity a re-creation of the event (l’Humanité. August 26, 2004). Historians are accustomed to assembling pottery shards of information into a coherent whole, discarding some, highlighting others, all in an attempt to make some sense of the past and to capture its meaning as accurately as possible. Moreover, Bon gives himself some license of expression in his repeated explanations of his note taking practices:
“I was allowed to take notes, . . . I don’t claim that he said exactly what I am reporting here” (Bon, p. 42).
“When I’m taking notes, I’m not in a state to be able to answer even the least direct question; the need for exactness requires all of your attention. One is in someone else’s head, he cannot leave to return to his own. . . Rather accept the silences, allow them to grow in order to incite the other to take it up again and, if one interrupts, let it be only to be more precise, never to suggest a word that has not already been said. . . . ” (Bon, p. 87).
“An unedited [brute] transcription, by her own insistence,” of her spoken words as recorded (Bon, pp. 89, 93).
For Bon, the meaning of factory closure was centered in the people who lost their livelihoods–and their circle of companions, and their daily routine, and their sense of self. Bon was also attempting to ensure that what happened at Daewoo is not forgotten: “I didn’t know, before coming here, the violence of this process [of closing down the factories] . . . . To remember, is to create the possibility of memory. The Korean group had carefully packed up its archives and its computers. But in Lorraine, a land which has been based for so many centuries on the mines and iron, a land of so many former immigrations–all of the women and men who were questioned spoke in political terms and remembered the struggles. In Lorraine there is a necessity for this point of view that I have not noted in other serious collective layoffs . . .” (l’Humanité. August 26, 2004).
Here is the sixteen-year story of Daewoo, as ripped from the headlines:
Le Monde, November 25, 1987: Two new factories have been announced for the Longwy area, hard hit by the crisis in the coal and steel industries. One will be JVC audio-France, an affiliate of the Japanese company, that will build CD players and other audio equipment, with an expected investment of 80 million francs and a work force of 270. The other will be the first South Korean factory in France, built by the Daewoo company; it will be eligible for government subsidies of up to one third of its investment of 35 million, with an expectation of 150 jobs. [This factory became Villers-la Montagne.]
Le Monde, February 8, 1992: The closing of steelworks Usinor-Sacilor will cost 3,370 jobs. This loss will partially be made up by Renault, which plans to expand its existing factory. In addition, Daewoo plans to set up a television factory at Fameck, at an investment of 80 milllion, that will provide 314 jobs; they are also considering a cathode tube facility, with 300 jobs. The state will invest in infrastructure throughout the Thionville area.
Le Monde, February 3, 1993: Daewoo is considering a cathode tube production facility near Longwy, which will require an investment of 730 million francs for 610 jobs. Unfortunately, the European Commission only allows a subsidy of 30%; it is likely that the French government can only provide 25% of the cost, in any case. Foreign investors have been complaining that Wales (for example) offers a 50% subsidy.
Le Monde, November 2, 1993: The Fameck television factory has opened, and Daewoo has definitely committed to the third cathode ray factory. By 1995 the company will employ 1,100 workers in Lorraine and will have invested nearly a billion francs in the region.
Daewoo’s forward momentum was halted for more than a year by its involvement in a friendly takeover attempt. In March 1994, according to a timeline from Le Monde, the government announced its intention to privatize the big but insolvent state-owned firm, Thomson. In October 1996, Prime Minister Alain Juppé selected the joint offer by Lagardère-Daewoo. In December 1996, the Commission of Privatization turned down the offer. In July 1997, new Prime Minister Lionel Jospin stopped the process of privatization.
Writing in 1997, when the Privatization Commission had just killed the deal, economists Yoon and Feigenbaum suggested that Daewoo was actually a good fit for the firm. Its partner Lagardère (which owned Matra) wanted only Thomson’s defense industry sector, known as Thomson CSF. Daewoo wanted only Thomson multimédia, for its brand name, market, and reputation as a maker of high-end home electronics, in contrast to their own low-end line. Further, they had expanded widely in Europe, and had experience in the special difficulties of taking over state-run firms, as Thomson was–as they had done in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine, for example. Le Monde reported that the French state would invest 11 billion francs–the state-owned Thomson was deeply in debt and essentially in bankruptcy–and Daewoo would invest 10 billion (Yoon and Feigenbaum, pp. 25-27). Juppé, apparently in an ill-judged moment of fellowship and good cheer, made the mistake of celebrating the price of the takeover as “a symbolic single franc,” which he had to take back.
l’Humanité, October 17, 1996: The decision by Alain Juppé that Thomson will go to the bid placed by Lagardère-Daewoo is strongly contested by the the union CFDT, representing the workers of Thomson Télévision d’Angers. The Daewoo salaries, they say, do not rise above minimum wage; the work rules are violated, toxic products are handled carelessly and not reported, the gas detectors don’t work, there is no annual negotiation with the workers, as is required.
l’Humanité, October 23, 1996: The PDG (CEO) of Daewoo, Soon Hoon Bae, gives a press conference about their impending takeover of Thomson Multimédia; it is not a success. He responds to none of the major questions–for example, how much would Daewoo spend in taking over the Thomson debt? How would Daewoo create 5,000 new jobs in a depressed home electronics market? No answers.
Le Monde, October 29, 1996: South Korea’s former Minister of Defense has been arrested, along with the director of Daewoo’s auto manufacture in Poland, on charges of corruption. Kim Woo-Choong, “Chairman Kim,” founder of the company, was just sentenced in August to 2.5 years in prison for fraudulently inflating the assets of his company, so that he could continue to expand and get contracts and subsidies. (Kim’s situation would percolate for awhile.) Le Monde suggests drily that the arrests in Seoul will likely imperil Daewoo’s takeover of Thomson; moreover, they suggest that “insiders” believe that the cost of taking on Thomson and its heavy liabilities might be too much for Daewoo, which already has a high debt to capital ratio.
Le Monde, November 1, 1996: Growing criticism of the Thomson takeover and the “symbolic 1 franc” price leads the president of Daewoo electronics, Soon Hoon Bae, to give an interview to La Tribune, in which he reveals that the offer in reality is not one franc but an investment of 10 billion, as only a first step; and he notes that Daewoo will have invested more than 5 billion francs in France by 2000. The CFDT, which is against the takeover, remarks that Daewoo also gets a number of advantages, including the Research and Development carried out by Thomson.
l’Humanité, November 5, 1996: A Daewoo executive, interviewed by Libération, in discussing the future Thomson takeover, says that “There are 350 people at Thomson who don’t have any function (ne servent à rien) at Thomson Multimédia and we’re going to have to simplify the organization. The management is oversized, and we’ll be able to produce high quality goods at competitive prices only by getting rid of this burden.” He adds that while the workforce as a whole will remain French, they are bringing in a number of South Korean executives.
l’Humanité, November 8, 1996: L’Humanité interviews the two CFDT representatives at Mont-Saint-Martin, Jean-Bruno Cordier and Maryline Quaglia, about the impending takeover by Daewoo of Thomson Multimédia, which they are attempting to stop. In addition to the low wages and lack of safety precautions, Quaglia recalls the tension after the recent wildcat strike at Villers, caused by “ras-le-bol” (fed-upness) and the occupation of the factory, at which point the management called the police. Both Quaglia and Cordier are critical of the Daewoo practice of recruiting the young, the unemployed, and the unskilled, giving them no training; they are content with their high turnover, which keeps wages low. She is currently trying to appeal the firing of four young workers who were given an impossible “speed test” for soldering, which they failed. Cordier adds that there are no chairs in the factory, that they have to remain standing during their shift, that the machines never stop, in violation of safety rules; and that a South Korean engineer who had just arrived was killed when he was “caught up” in one of the machines. [He was decapitated.] Quaglia concludes: “We don’t want to demonize Daewoo. Do not accuse us of racism; I denounce with as much force the anti-social policies of certain French owners. Nevertheless, if there is a marriage between Daewoo and Thomson, I fear that the collision will be head-on.”
l’Humanité, November 9, 1996: Jean-Bruno Cordier, CDFT union representative at Mont-Saint-Martin, is suspended for two days without pay for bringing to the workers’ attention a newspaper article that was negative about Daewoo, as well as a document written by “the militants” of the Thomson factory in Angers; virtually all of the Thomson workers had demonstrated against the Daewoo takeover (See also Le Monde, November 10, 1996).
l’Humanité, November 14, 1996: A large union meeting is held in Seoul, South Korea to express a number of concerns, including the prospective Daewoo takeover of Thomson Multimédia in France. According to a spokesman of the workers, “every time Daewoo starts an electronics factory abroad, the assembly lines are cut back in Korea, and layoffs follow.”
l’Humanité, November 18, 1996: The management at Villers-la-Montagne has just refused to recognize the CGT union delegate (and this after suspending the CFDT delegate at Mont-Saint-Martin). The CGT suggests that the company that wants to take over Thomson Multimédia should learn how industrial relations are normally conducted in France.
The takeover deal is stopped in December, 1996, by the Privatization Commission in France, normally expected to act as a rubber stamp, which protests on the grounds of technology transfer (including digital advances, flat screen televisions, and so on) that were the product of Thomson’s R&D division. Yoon and Feigenbaum suggested that the controversy raised by the deal might have stemmed from racism and anti-immigrant feelings, an idea strengthened by the evidence of some of the rhetoric around the deal (Yoon and Feigenbaum, pp. 28-29). It is also clear, however, that trade unions had been raising questions about management style, work rules, and safety.
l’Humanité, March 19, 1997: Soon Hoon-bae, after closing a Belgian factory owned by the company, complains that the French state should create a more favorable environment for business, “by investing in infrastructure, providing fiscal incentives, training workers, and accepting foreign managers.”
l’Humanité, April 22, 1997.: There is a wildcat strike, lasting two hours, at Fameck, the maker of televisions, that involves 200 of the 308 employees. They want better working conditions and a 20% raise for the lowest paid; Daewoo offers 5%.
Les Echos, May 14, 1997: Daewoo Orion at Mont-Saint-Martin, producer of cathode tubes, is fined 400,000 fr. and put under judicial supervision for two years as they develop a safety plan. The ruling comes about because of the death of the South Korean engineer by means of a machine that was not in conformity with safety regulations. It is reported that government safety inspectors had already sent multiple safety warnings to the plant. Daewoo plans to appeal, their lawyer noting that they are one of the largest foreign investors in France, and that the French government should “show confidence” in them as they work to correct the “weak points,” adding that there are 3,000 jobs at stake and 3 billion in future investments.
The television program C’est à suivre had previously set up a sort of intervention between the Daewoo CEO, government inspectors, and Maryline Quaglia as the CFDT union delegate. On a program broadcast on June 19, 1997, they replay some of the original program; Quaglia, who has returned, is then allowed to question five newly elected deputies to the National Assembly.
Quaglia (apparently now retired as a CFDT union worker, as her facebook page suggests) sees in the EU a possible way to regulate the “law of the jungle” which has led companies to shop for subsidies and then move out when those are exhausted. While the EU has established basic minimum standards throughout their member states, France itself, as this recent article suggests, has under Macron gone in the direction of easing the fabled protections for French worker–which, as the Daewoo case suggests, already have serious limitations. Instead, the focus is on making the country attractive for employers. What’s most astonishing about the broadcast is the lack of ideas from the newly elected National Assembly members.
Le Monde, November 30, 1997: Daewoo has decided to delay another new plant at Thionville for cathode ray tubes, a planned extension of Mont-Saint-Martin, as well as a possible refrigerator factory at Verdun, because of the financial crisis in Asia; they also want to evaluate the new social legislation in France, notably the new 35 hour week. (This came from the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s “cohabiting” with President Jacques Chirac.)
Le Monde, January 16, 1998 Daewoo confirms the indefinite hold on its planned investments in Lorraine. Among their reasons are a restructuring of Daewoo itself, and its own financial difficulties, worsened by the current financial crisis in Asia. Daewoo, which currently employs 1300 in France, was to have employed 3,000 by the year 2000.
Le Monde, June 17, 1999: About 80% of the 600 workers at Mont Saint-Martin Orion are continuing their strike begun the previous day. They want more jobs created, higher wages, and “more ‘respect’.” (sic). They are particularly angry that employees who return after a lengthy sick leave are not able to resume their previous jobs and are demoted to lesser jobs or no the designation “no division,” which means that they must simply remain at the factory without assignment. The FO and CGT are leading the strike; the CFDT is supportive but believes the moment ill-chosen, given the troubles of Daewoo.
Le Monde, June 19, 1999: The spontaneous strike that began five days ago at Daewoo Orion is continuing. Olivier, age 28, complains about culture clash: their South Korean managers say that they don’t have “team spirit”; “success, according to them, comes from the abnegation of the individual.” Their CGT representative at the factory, Ayt Mouhoud, states that they want a 600 franc monthly wage increase and they want the company to stop its “bullying” behavior. Le Monde acknowledges that certain management techniques “are in fact astonishing.” When someone comes back after extended sick leave, they are told there is no place for them and put in an empty room to do nothing. States Mouhoud, “Their objective is a triage of personnel, to disgust people so they will leave.” It is acknowledged that Daewoo has an unusually high absenteeism rate. The dispute is now under mediation, and in the meantime the “no division” practice will be suppressed.
Libération, June 25, 1999: Hamid, age 32, at Daewoo Orion from the beginning, suffered an injury at work and upon his return went into “no division,” the term for telling workers returning from sick leave that there is no place for them on the lines. Either you sit idly by, in the midst of those who are being driven to go faster, or you clean up the place; he describes it as a “humiliating punishment.” The work is hot and dangerous; one of the South Korean workers was recently decapitated in a horrific accident. Just a few days ago, on June 14, 1999, a wildcat strike began, and is still continuing. A number of complaints bubble to the surface. Of the twenty or so South Koreans on site, only two speak any French. Olivier Hippart, age, 24, complains that “sometimes, one of them [Koreans] is at your back for a quarter of an hour. They watch you work, then leave without saying anything.” Human Resources has had four directors in four years, and the current one combines his post with that of director of security. Worker motivation is described as “near zero”; JVC and Panasonic, also recipients of massive subsidies, have come and gone, and the fear the same will happen to them. Daewoo, which is reputed to have received close to a billion in public subsidies, has reached its EU-mandated limit. Libération notes that local government officials are urging them to take advantage of the new Aubry law (the 35 hour per week law) which provides subsidies to employers who reduce their work week–namely, that they can reduce their social security contributions by 9,000 francs per worker the first year to 5,000 francs in the fifth year (Trumbell, p. 9).
(It later becomes evident that Daewoo reduced–or rather stopped paying–their social security contributions without adoping the 35-hour work week).
l’Humanité, June 28, 1999: The newspaper interviews Christophe Herbelet, age 27, at Daewoo Orion: “There’s a big thing that arrives in front of us every ten seconds. It’s the back of a television cathode tube. . . . You have to lift all that and adjust it. This work doesn’t require a lot of training, you can learn it very quickly, but the problem is repetition.” Between 2,000 and 2,300 cathode tubes pass before him every day. His shift begins at 10 pm and ends at 6 am. He lives 55 kilometers away and has to drive; there is no moving or transportation allowance, no public transport. He had taken this job, after some temporary positions, because he wanted to be settled, but now he wonders if he did the right thing, because “they treat us like dogs. The Koreans provoke us, they stand behind us and demand that we speed up. I often want to punch them but, like the others, I hold myself back.” He is grateful for the strike; it provides a breathing space.
Le Monde, July 20, 1999: Daewoo announces its proposal to its creditors for a restructuring of its debt, in order to avoid bankruptcy.
Le Monde, September 16, 1999: On September 15, Daewoo announces that it will ask for a moratorium on a part of its debt, which totals 57 billion USD.
Le Monde, September 16, 1999: Sources close to Christian Pierret, secretary of state for Industry, are quoted as saying that Daewoo is going to close its three factories, employing 1,200, in Lorraine. The CFDT organizes a demonstration in front of the regional prefecture at Metz, noting that JVC and Panasonic have also left.
Le Monde, September 17, 1999: The Daewoo management categorically denies the alarmist Le Monde story that claims that Daewoo wants to close all three plants in Lorraine. They will be restabilizing their financial situation either by an agreement with the investment firm Walid Alamar or with the South Korean government and creditors–which means, as Le Monde notes, that they have not in fact stabilized their finances yet. Gérard Longuet, president of the regional council of Lorraine, is quoted as saying that he would have preferred someone like GE to take over.
Le Monde, November 4, 1999: Daewoo is in bankruptcy, with a debt of more than 50 billion USD; the South Korean government has expressed a willingness to bail out 5 South Korean creditors, including three major banks, who are now in danger because of this collapse. The CEOs of the twelve main entities of Daewoo have all resigned. The founder Kim Woo-choong, currently out of the country, phoned in with his resignation.
Le Monde, December 15, 1999: GM has presented a takeover bid to Daewoo; the offer does not include the debts of the South Korean firm.
Le Monde, April 7, 2000: The workers of Hyundai in South Korea have declared a strike in solidarity with the Daewoo workers in South Korea, who don’t wish to be taken over by a foreign firm.
This overall bankruptcy does not end the functioning of the various different entities of the corporation; nevertheless they are clearly on life support, as they search for buyers. In the midst of some varying figures as reported by the press, a study shows that of all the firms that received subsidies in this region, three were foreign–Daewoo, Saiag-Tokai, and Ebo (the two latter Japanese-Italian and German, respectively). Daewoo received the most–153 million francs in French and European aid, for Villers-la Montagne and Mont-Saint-Martin, together employing 950 people. (Hardouin-Lemoine, p. 316)
Le Monde, January 29, 2002: Daewoo has just cut the workforce at Fameck by 120, out of 289. At the time of this announcement, the Fameck workers were told that the Daewoo Poland factory, also making televisions, was more productive than they are and that their own productivity had fallen. There is some hope; they might be retooled for a new television model under development, but that would require the Daewoo mother company to invest 1.22 million euros. The workers at the other two factories in Lorraine have expressed concern. The managing director of Mont-Saint-Martin Orion states that they can’t make a profit unless they add a second line of production, which would require an investment of 88-100 million euros. The company had recently cut the production lines at Villers-la-Montagne from five to three; there are no plans for expansion or retooling there. Moreover, Le Monde adds the alarming news that the government authorities “had turned a blind eye” to the fact that the company has stopped paying into the URSSAF fund–essentially, its employer contributions to social security.
Le Monde, April 10, 2002: Fameck has been on strike for two days, triggered by the news that M. Choi, head of Daewoo television, is coming. He has sent word that he will refuse to enter the factory while it is occupied. Asked one of the CFDT delegates, “What’s his real goal in coming here? Our ‘big boss’ (sic) doesn’t even have the courage to meet us.”
Le Monde, April 17, 2002: The unions representing the workers of Daewoo Fameck have announced their intention to “harden” the strike that began on April 8, after the failure of an attempted mediation.
Le Monde, July 27, 2002: The employees of the microwave factory at Villers-la-Montagne have just been laid off for three weeks, beginning July 26; the workers are fearful that the plant will not reopen. Barbara Giagnoria, CFDT and secretary of the Committee of Entreprise (a legally required worker negotiating group), states that their boss, who had just resigned, had told them the market was saturated and that the production of microwaves in France wasn’t profitable because the labor costs were too high; they could employ workers in China or Korea much more cheaply. Giagnoria states that they want a clear and negotiated end–a “social plan”–with definite closing dates and with layoff bonuses, rather than a sudden surprise closing. The mayor of the town, also asking for time to prepare for a large number of the suddenly unemployed, says that he too has been stonewalled by the management.
L’Usine nouvelle, September 10, 2002: The management of the Daewoo factory microwaves (Villers-la-Montagne) informed the Comité d’entreprise (of workers) that the plant would be closing from this date to the end of the year, a little over three months, a move that affects 230 workers. The factory has already carried out a partial reorganization, shutting down one production line and laying off 100 workers; the problem, they say, is the unprofitability of the factory. They plan to reopen the plant after the holidays.
Libération, September 10, 2002: The union representatives, in response to the layoffs at Villers-la-Montagne, express their concern about the other two Daewoo factories and state they will “pressure” the politicians “who had rolled out the red carpet [for Daewoo]” and had arranged the state subsidies for their enterprises.
Le Monde, October 2, 2002: About fifty workers at Daewoo Orion in Mont-Saint-Martin have occupied the factory, demanding that the management provide straight answers about the future of the plant. Fameck is being closed and Villers-la Montagne’s supposedly temporary closure has just been announced. Daewoo Orion, moreover, has just filed for bankruptcy in the local court. “Our plans do not foresee any layoffs,” the workers are told by a spokesman, “we only want to realize some serious economies by reorganization and renegotiations with our suppliers.”
For a couple of months late in 2002 there were layoffs at the different factories for several weeks, with the promise of a definite reopening on a specific date. Workers believed that the respective factories would never reopen, and spoke of the closings as definitive. They became increasingly frustrated because of the lack of transparency that kept them in a state of anxious uncertainty.
l’humanité, October 3, 2002: Villers-la-Montagne has just announced its definitive closure; the Daewoo group received 280 million francs from public funds and had been courted by the PED (Pôle européen de développement), a planned transition for the region to attract industry after the collapse of the steel industry. They quote Christelle, who has her head in her hands: “In January 2002, the management talked of investing, of producing a million microwaves, and promised bonuses.”
l’Humanité. December 19, 2002: Just before the Christmas holiday, the management at Fameck has called in worker delegates for a rather long meeting. Zefa Sobhy comes out with the news that, “We’ll all be let go before January 20,” adding, “We’ve served as guinea pigs for those people to get production going at a low cost. So long as French money was coming in, all went well. With the end of the subsidies, we’re the turkeys. They’re transferring our factory to Poland, but for how long? Workers are Kleenex in this world, that’s all.”
Le Monde, December 24, 2002: The employees at Daewoo Orion have held their boss, Seung Won Ahn, captive in his office for about 36 hours; they have now released him. Maryline Quaglia, CFDT, reports that the end came because both the local government and the management agreed to sequester the money to pay what is due to them.
Le Monde, January 4, 2003: About 30 of the workers of Daewoo Orion have occupied their factory again, an occupation which began on January 2. They have announced, through Isabelle Banny, the CGT spokesman, that they are holding as hostages the chemical products in the factory and are preparing an ultimatum. Banny states that they want firm guarantees that their wages and other support are protected, in the event of a factory closing; they are concerned that Daewoo has apparently not posted the required bond [agreed to in December] as a guarantee. Lazhar Maazy, a municipal councilor in Mont-Saint-Martin, recalls that when the boss was held captive last December, the factory was left open and unguarded; various things had been pillaged and small fires had been set in the corners, requiring the fire department. Of the four unions involved, three–CGT, FO, and CFTC–are in favor of the militant stance, while the CFDT, with Quaglia as union delegate, is not.
Bon, Daewoo: On January 7, 2003, hooded workers at Mont-Saint-Martin called reporters in to demonstrate how they could, if they wished, dump toxic chemicals from the factory into the Chiers river. One of Bon’s informants was disapproving, noting that when the workers of Cellatex had done the same thing, they had shown their faces (Bon, p. 115).
Le Monde, January 24, 2003: The Daewoo-Orion factory has been destroyed by fire. The fire was called in at 8:45 p.m. on January 23, and was declared contained at 11:15 p.m. The blaze, which was accompanied by chemical explosions inside the buildings, required 34 engines and 150 men from the surrounding areas, with even Luxembourg and Belgian engines arriving towards the end. The workers had been on strike since December 19 and had threatened to throw chemicals into the river; they feared that the company would simply be closed without a payout, a practice known as “social dumping.” They had returned to work on January 20 and were sent home again on January 23, the day of the fire. Daewoo Orion had filed for bankruptcy, claiming a debt of about 23 million euros, (a figure which excluded payouts for the workers). The building was unoccupied when the fire began. Finished cathode tubes, of a worth estimated at 1.2 million euros, were completely destroyed, as were supplies; 30-40% of the building was destroyed as well. (This site includes a photo of the Mont-Saint-Martin factory before it burned, as well as a brief timeline of events from 1989 to the final closing of the last factory in 2003.)
Le Monde, January 25, 2003: The morning after the fire, the prefect moved quickly to seize the chemicals left in the factory. With the destruction of all the cathode tubes, that could have been sold to finance their buyout, the workers now see “their last and meager hopes go up in smoke.” An investigation began immediately, and authorities have not ruled out the possibility of arson. Jean-Yves Le Deaut, the Socialist Party deputy of the region, hopes that it will not prove to be “a blind act of despair . . . But one can at the same time ask who profited by the crime. Surely not the Daewoo employees who today see any chance of the factory starting up again even farther away.” There is talk from local officials of rebuilding, “reindustrializing,” but the workers quoted by the newspaper know that it’s gone.
From Bon, Daewoo: interview of an employee formerly of Villers, whose husband worked at Mont-Saint-Martin. They lived in a different town, but had driven to the factory as soon as they heard: “You carry the fire in your head for a long time,” she said. “The noise that it made, the booms and the cracks. . . . and then, in the darkness of your bedroom, you still see these blue or green or red flames.” Many were drawn to the scene; she recalled seeing a man standing alone, “immobile,” with tears running down his cheeks as he watched (Bon, pp. 26-28).
l’Humanité, January 27, 2003: Questions are being asked about the fire. The factory, in financial difficulties, had closed production for a time but had then opened up on January 20, 2003. On January 23, the day of the fire, the workers had been sent home again. Isabelle Banny, of the CGT, had been keeping watch at night along with other union members, in the absence of factory guards: “The site was deserted when we arrived a few minutes before the fire. The management had bizarrely taken off. We were at the guard post when the alarm sounded.”
Le Monde, January 27, 2003: Arcelor announces that it is closing the last two steel blast furnaces in the Fensch valley, with a loss of 1,500 jobs. They are three kilometers away from Daewoo Fameck. One of the workers, identified only as Alain, said that this closing “has been in the air for some time.”
l’Humanité, January 29, 2003: 250 workers from Mount-Saint-Martin come to the Ministry of Finance in Paris, some carrying banners: “Daewoo voleurs, État complice” (Daewoo thieves, Government accomplices). A combined trade union delegation from CGT, led by Isabelle Banny, from the FO, from the CFTC, and from the CFDT presented the demands for the state to finance a transition plan for the workers, of two years pay (at their old salaries) for retraining, an indemnity for “préjudice moral et matériel,” residence permits for ten years for those workers who were not French citizens. The group then headed off to the South Korean embassy, to demonstrate solidarity with South Korean workers.
Bon, Daewoo: One of Bon’s informants, one of those who had gone to the ministry, insisted on showing him a videotape; when they came out, they were face to face with the CRS. Stated Banny: “The government rolled out the red carpet for [Daewoo], without requiring from them the least commitment [to keep the jobs there], and they used the Mont-Saint-Martin factory like a piggy bank [pompe à fric, literally money pump]. As for the workers, they were isolated by degrading conditions of work, paid minimum wage [salaires de misère]: but when we come to tell them this, they bring out the police.” [Bon, p. 140].
Le Monde, February 3, 2004: Those in Mont-Saint-Martin are astonished that the government is not investigating the financial improprieties of Daewoo. They have, however, investigated the fire. One of the former workers, Kamel Belkadi, has been in jail for three months, based on the testimony of one of his (former) fellow suspects; workers who were guarding the factory have said, on the contrary, that he was playing cards with them when the fire broke out. He is, says the CGT, “a sacrificial goat and an ideal culprit, militant, bearded, [Muslim].”
L’Usine nouvelle, February 4, 2003: Daewoo Fameck has gone into bankruptcy. The factory had been closed since January 6. The German firm ThyssenKrupp has expressed some interest in acquiring it.
Le Monde, February 22, 2003: The French government will take over the financing of the severance agreement for the 550 workers at Orion, since Daewoo is in bankruptcy and is unable to provide support. The cost will be about 6.4 million euros.
Libération, March 1, 2003: ThyssenKrupp, which makes steering columns for cars at a factory at Florange, in Moselle, is going to buy Daewoo Fameck. By 2006-2007 they are expecting to employ 900 workers.
Bon, Daewoo: The ThyssenKrupp factory retooled itself and began hiring in the fall of 2003. By the following fall, they had hired only about 50 workers, all men, and one of the requirements for the job was a knowledge of German (Bon, pp. 79-80).
Le Monde, February 2, 2004: Le Monde goes back a year later to find that few of the Daewoo workers at Mount-Saint-Martin have found jobs. Ammar Bouchama, former union official there, states that “For a lot of young people, the hiring at Daewoo represented a first job, a step towards their insertion into an active life.” Most of them had few qualifications; Daewoo recruited in the nearby HLM (subsidized housing) neighborhood, hiring young people, people from the Maghreb (North Africa), children of former steelworkers, some undocumented immigrants as well. Most feel abandoned by the state, unlike those workers at Metaleurop in Nord, who lost their jobs when the factory suddenly closed but were given generous indemnities. Eyes are on the new Esch-sur-Alzette technical center, in Luxembourg (too risky, of course to the undocumented) but both Maryline Quaglia (CFDT) and Isabelle Banny (CGT) are concerned about the focus on the “Luxembourg El Dorado,” as Banny calls it; Quaglia fears that the Daewoo situation means the end of employment initiatives in the region.
One of the largest employers in Esch is ArcelorMittel, the world’s largest steel producer, whose corporate headquarters are also in Luxembourg. It was formed from mergers with several other steel producers including Usinor–In other words, Arcelor-Usinor, which closed in Lorraine in 1991. The Esch factory is 37 kilometers from Uckange. Which you could drive, so long as there is no carbon tax.
Libération, September 4, 2004: Kamel Belkadi, age 34, formerly employed at Daewoo Orion, is on trial for arson in the Mont-Saint-Michel factory fire. Thirty CGT members are in court to support him. So too is the novelist Dominque Manotti, who describes the trial as “surreal,” noting that Chairman Kim himself is living in luxury, undisturbed, in France, despite an international arrest warrant against him. The presiding judge angers the court room when she remarks, for no apparent reason, that “one doesn’t recruit assembly line workers from the elites of society.” There is no material evidence, and so the case rests largely on the testimony of Pietro Tavera, one of the three workers initially arrested with Belkadi, who stated during questioning that the defendant had borrowed a lighter from him on the night of the fire and later had confessed to Tavera that he had started it. Tavera, according to the reporter, appears “fragile and easily influenced.” Alain Behr, attorney for Belkadi, says of Tavera: “Leave him to me for 48 hours and I’ll have him accusing the police.”
Libération, October 13, 2004: Kamel Belkadi has been sentenced to 3 years in prison for arson and has been assessed a fine of 30,000 euros for damages. The 40,000 destroyed cathode tubes alone were worth over 1 million euros. In court Belkadi denied all charges, and stated that he was going to prison only because he had gone on strike. The reporter notes that although not a union delegate, he had been one of the leaders of the occupation of the factory, at the time when they had threatened to throw chemicals in the river. Isabelle Banny of the CGT, in court every day to support the defendant, is outraged but not surprised at the verdict and sentence.
New York Times, June 15, 2005: Kim Woo Choong, founder of Daewoo, has returned to South Korea after nearly six years as a fugitive. He has been accused of falsifying his assets by 41 billion USD and obtaining 9.2 trillion in “illegal financing.” Protesters at the airport are shouting for open parliamentary hearings. “I sincerely apologize to the people,” he says.
“Former” auto workers? Accurate, if cruel.
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